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The private annuity has been defined as an "agreement where an
individual transfers property to another person, whose business is not
selling annuities [or who does not from time to time sell annuities'], in
exchange for a promise to make fixed, periodic payments for the remainder
of the annuitant's life." 2 Typically, the agreement is between family
members or between a shareholder and a closely held corporation.3 In
the latter situation the private annuity may be given by a corporation as
part of a stock redemption plan in connection with the transfer of control
of the corporation to younger family members.4 Occasionally, the private
annuity is used as part of a trust arrangement,5 especially when the an-
nuitant desires that others have the benefit of the property but is not
convinced of their ability to exercise prudent management of the property.
For the older taxpayer the private annuity offers several advantages. 6
It provides the taxpayer with a means of passing property to the objects
of his bounty, thereby decreasing his taxable estate at death; yet the tax-
payer remains assured of receiving a minimum yearly income for the re-
mainder of his life. If an annuity transaction is structured properly, the
1. Rev. Rul. 62-137, 1962-2 C.B. 28; See Rev. Rul. 62-136, 1962-2 C.B. 12.
2. Sturm, The Marital Deduction and a Private Annuity, 54 TAXES 54, 56
(1976).
3. In order to obtain income tax deferral, the annuitant may not receive
any security for the obligor's promise. See generally text accompanying notes 30-
73 infra.
4. See Fehrs Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'g
58 T.C. 174 (1972).
5. See Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'g 58
T.C. 854 (1972); Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757 (1972).
6. See generally C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER, & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND Giwr TAXES § 40.9 (3d ed. 1974); Behrenfeld, Coming Into Their Own-
Identifying and Planning for the Emerging Taxable Estate, N.Y.U. 36TH ANN.
INST. ON FED. TAX. 231, 238 (1978); Goldberg, Annuities, A Comparative Analysis:
Intra-Family, College.Type, Commercial, N.Y.U. 22d ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX.
1213 (1964); Magram, The Use of Private Annuities Under the 1976 Tax Reform
Act, THIRTIETH TAX INST.-U. OF S. CAL. L. CENTER 655 (1978); Middleditch,
The Private Annuity: A Way to Cut Estate Costs, Defer Gain, Get Annuity Tax
Benefits, 24 J. OF TAX. 160 (1966); Phillips, Private Annuities in Estate Planning,
52 TAXES 50 (1974); Ross, The Private Annuity as a Tax Minimizing Instrument,
41 TAXES 199 (1963); Sullivan, The Private Annuity: A New Look at an Old
Estate Planning Tool, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 466 (1978).
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TAXATION OF PRIVATE ANNUITIES
taxpayer should be able to defer the recognition of capital gain on the
transfer of appreciated property.7 If the transaction is bona fide, at
arm's length, free of donative intent, and for an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth, the taxpayer incurs no gift tax.8 This
also brings the transfer outside the scope of sections 2035-2088 of the
Internal Revenue Code. 9 The unrecovered, anticipated annuity payments
remaining at the annuitant's death are not included in his taxable estate,
and after-transfer property appreciation escapes estate or gift taxation.
- The private annuity does have some notable disadvantages, 10 al-
though many of these can be avoided with proper planning. One concern
is the unsettled issue of the income tax treatment accorded the annuitant-
ttransferor of appreciated property. Also, the annuitant loses control of the
property transferred, which can be particularly important when the
property is the annuitant's major source of income. If he desires to defer
capital gain recognition and avoid estate taxes, the annuitant cannot re-
tain an interest in the property transferred nor receive any other security for
the obligor's promise. 1" If the annuitant is older, the obligor under the
annuity contract may be required to make high periodic payments in
order to avoid gift taxes. If received and unconsumed at the time of the
annuitant's death, these payments will increase the annuitant's taxable
estate. The obligor does not get an interest deduction on any portion of
his periodic payments.' 2 If the annuitant dies prematurely his estate does
7. See text accompanying notes 30-73 infra.
8. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958). A great deal of litigatioi has centered
around the proper method of valuing the annuity. In order to overturn the use
of the table selected by the Commissioner, the taxpayer must show that under
the circumstances the use of the table is arbitrary and unreasonable. As would
be expected, the taxpayer seldom wins this dispute. Compare Dunigan v. United
States, 434 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1970) and Ellis Sarasota Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States, 40 A.F.T.R.2d 77-6239 (M.D. Fla. 1977) with Dix v. Commissioner,
392. F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1968); Estate of Christ v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 171
(9th Cir. 1973); and Estate of Lloyd G. Bell v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
In Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43, the Commissioner ruled that the appropriate
table to be used for valuing a private annuity contract is contained in Treas.
Reg. § 20.2031-7 (f) (1958). Subsequently, this regulation was amended and is to be
used only for valuation of annuities entered into on or before December 31, 1970.
For valuation of annuities entered into after that date, Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10
(1958) isto be used. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7, T.D. 7077, 1970-2 C.B. 183.
9. The annuitant must be cautious not to structure the transfer in such
a way that it appears he retains a life estate. See C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMFR, & J. Mc-
CoRD, supra note 6, at 237.
10. See note 6 supra.
1l, See note 3 supra; C. LOWNDEs, R. KRAMER, & J. McCo", supra note 6.
12. Despite the fact that under § 72 the annuitant excludes a portion of each
annuity payment and reports only as income the interest component thereof, the
obligor is not allowed a corresponding interest deduction. His payments are re-
garded as capital expenditures. Dix v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 313 (4th Cir.
1968), aff'g 46 T.C. 796 (1966). Commissioner v. John C. Moore Corp., 42 F.2d
186 (2d Cir. 1930), stands alone to the contrary. However, I.R.C. § 483 (f) (5) may
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not get a loss deduction, 13 and the obligor will have to decrease his basis
in the property acquired from the annuitant.14 On the other hand, if the
annuitant should exceed his life expectancy, the obligor probably will
not be able to take a loss deduction for payments made in excess of the
value of the consideration originally received.15 Under one view, once the
annuitant exceeds his life expectancy he no longer gets the capital portion
of subsequent annuity payments tax-free. 16 The annuitant must also be
aware of the possible application of the grantor trust rules if he retains
any control over the disposition or enjoyment of the property transferred
or the income therefrom." 7 In addition, inflation will gradually erode the
purchasing power of the annuity payments. Thus, unless the annuitant
enjoys other dependable sources of income, what may have seemed a very
adequate annual income at the outset gradually may become inadequate.
Obviously, before an individual purchases a private annuity, he
must carefully consider the estate, gift, and income tax consequences to
the annuitant-transferor and the obligor-transferee. The purpose of this
comment is to discuss one aspect of the needed analysis-the income tax
consequences to the annuitant.
II. GENERAL TREATMENT OF ANNUITIES
In most instances section 72 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
will determine the amount of each annuity payment which must be in-
13. See text accompanying note 154 infra.
14. Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352. See also Rev. Rul. 72-81, 1972-i C.B.
99. The first ruling sets forth rules for determining the transferee-obligor's basis
for purposes of depreciation and for determining the amount of gain or loss. It
initially takes a tentative annuity approach with the basis equal to the value of
the prospective payments. However, upon the occurrence of a condition subse-
quent, the basis is adjusted to actual cost. The second ruling applies Rev. Rul.
55.119, which was promulgated under the 1939 Code, to the 1954 Code.
15. See Manchina, The Private Annuity, 43 TAxEs 255, 265-68 (1965); I.T.
1242, 1-1 C.B. 61 (1922).
16. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43. Under this ruling each annuity payment
consists of two parts: (1) an excluded portion; and (2) an included portion, The
excluded portion is computed as:
adjusted basis in property transferred x annual annuity payment
annual payment x life expectancy.
The included portion consists of two parts: (a) the capital gain portion; and
(b) the annuity portion. The capital gain portion is computed as:
gain from the exchange
life expectancy.
The annuity portion is the amount which remains. The ruling specifically, pro-
vides that once the entire capital gain has been fully reported, "subsequent
amounts received (after applying the exclusion ratio) are to be reported as or-
dinary income." The prevailing view prior to Rev. Rul. 69-74 was that once the
full amount of gain had been taxed, the excluded portion of any excess payments
should not be taxed to the annuitant. See Sams, Private Annuities: Revenue
Ruling 69-74-Its Significance, Effect, and Validity, 23 VAND. L. REv. 675, 676
n.ll (1970).
17. I.R.C. §§ 671-678. See text accompanying notes 153-155 infra.
[Vol. 45
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cluded in gross income for the year of receipt.' s The entire annuity pay-
ment generally must be included, except that amount which represents
a reduction or return of premiums or other consideration paid.19 Section
72 (b) provides an "exclusion ratio" for this purpose. This ratio has as its
numerator the annuitant's "investment in the contract ' 20 and as its de-
nominator the "expected return" 2 1 under the contract.22 This ratio is
then applied against the annuity payment in order to determine the
amount to be excluded from gross income. The excess of the annuity
payment over the amount excluded must be reported in the annuitant's
gross income for the taxable year of receipt.23
The income tax consequences of a private annuity are greatly com-
plicated by the fact that the annuitant typically transfers appreciated
property to the transferee-obligor. This means that the annuitant will
have some gain realization potential in connection with the transfer.
Questions concerning the timing of any realization of gain and its rec-
ognition arise, and are further confused by the conflicting interpretations of
several applicable Code sections. 24 There is also a question as to the amount
which the annuitant should include as his "investment in the contract"
for purposes of section 72 (b)'s exclusion ratio.25 The resolution of these
questions determines whether the income tax consequences attendant
18. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
Amounts subject to § 72 . . . are considered "amounts received as an
annuity" only in the event that all of the following tests are met:
(i) They must be received on or after the "annuity starting date" as
that term is defined in paragraph (b) of § 1.72-4;
(ii) They must be payable in periodic installments at regular inter-
vals... over a period of more than one full year from the annuity
starting date; and
(iii) [With certain exceptions] . . . the total of the amounts payable
must be determinable at the annuity starting date either directly
from the terms of the contract or indirectly by the use of either
mortality tables or compound interest computations, or both, in
conjunction with such terms and in accordance with sound actuarial
theory.
Treas. Reg. § 1.72-2 (b) (2) (1956).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-1 (a), T.D. 6676, 1963-2 C.B. 41.
20. See text accompanying notes 133-145 infra.
21. I.R.C. § 72(c)(3) provides that expected return shall be determined as
follows: "(A) Life expectancy-If the expected return under the contract, for the
period on and after the annuity starting date, depends in whole or in part on
the life expectancy of one or more individuals, the expected return shall be com-
puted with reference to actuarial tables prescribed by the Secretary."
The tables mentioned in subparagraph (A) are provided in Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9
(1956). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.72-5 (1956). It is important to note that the Com-
missioner has ruled that the present value of the annuity contract should be com-
puted according to the tables provided in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1958). See note
8 supra.
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-4 (a) (1956).
23. Id.
24. See generally text accompanying notes 90-120 infra.
25. See generally text accompanying notes 133-145 infra.
1980]
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upon use of a particular private annuity justify its purchase by the an-
nuitant.
III. THE TREATMENT OF GAIN
The annuitant typically transfers appreciated property in exchange for
the obligor's unsecured promise to make future periodic payments. For
estate and gift tax purposes, it is most often advantageous to structure the
transaction as an arm's length transfer for full and adequate consideration
in money or money's worth.2 6 As a result, the annuitant will usually
have a gain on the transfer.
Section 1001 (a) defines the gain on the disposition of property as
the difference between the amount realized and the adjusted basis in the
property transferred.2 7 The excess of the "amount realized" over the
"adjusted basis" constitutes the realized gain.28 Section 1001 (c) states
that the entire amount of the gain thus computed should be recognized
unless another provision of the Code provides otherwise. 29 Thus, under
section 61 it would appear the annuitant should include in his gross in-
come for the year in which he transfers appreciated property to the ob-
ligor an amount equal to the excess of the "amount realized" over "his
adjusted basis." The annuitant, however, may be able to defer reporting
any gain from the transfer if the transaction is properly structured. There
are at least three possible grounds for income tax deferral: the open trans-
action doctrine; the equivalent of cash doctrine; and section 72 proration
of gain.
A. The Open Transaction Doctrine
Section 1001 (b) of the Code defines the "amount realized" from the
disposition of property as "the sum of any money received plus the fair
market value of the property (other than money) received." Under the
open transaction doctrine, whenever the value of the property received
does not have an ascertainable fair market value, the transaction is deemed
to be held "open." This means that the transferor need not include the
property received as an amount realized in the year of the disposition of
appreciated property. Instead, he may first recover his basis in the property
transferred as payments are made to him. He does not report any taxable
income from the transfer until he has received payments which exceed
his basis in the property.30 The regulations provide that only in rare
and extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no ascertain-
able value.81
26. See text accompanying notes 8 and 9 supra.
27. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (a) (1957).
28. Id.
'29. Such provisions of the Code include §§ 351 (a), 354, 361 (a), 371 (a) (1),
371 (b) (1), 721, 1031, 1035 and 1936. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1 (1957).
30. See generally 1 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERaL INcomE TAXATION,
§ 5.08 (rev. 1974).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (a) (1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6 (a)(2) (1958).
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The open transaction doctrine traces its origin to Burnet v. Logan,32
in which a cash basis taxpayer sold stock to a mining company, receiving
in return both cash and a promise that she would receive sixty cents on
each ton of ore the company mined. The company had mined large, but
varying, amounts of coal for the past twenty years, although under the
terms of its lease it was not required to mine any coal. The Supreme Court
held that it was impossible to determine with fair certainty the market
value of the promise. According to the Court, the taxpayer was entitled
to a return of capital before being charged with any taxable income. The
Court said that this approach would result in a fairer determination of
any income tax liability because it did not require "resort to mere estimates,
assumptions, and speculation." 33 Otherwise the taxpayer might not
ever recoup her investment and thus would have been taxed on a gain
she never received.34
The doctrine was first applied to private annuities in J. Darsie
Lloyd.35 There, the father of a wealthy comedian transferred stock to his
son and received in return his son's unsecured promise to make annuity
payments. The issue facing the court was whether there was any taxable
gain in the year the exchange was made; its resolution depended upon
whether the promise of the son to make the future payments had a fair
market value within the meaning of section 111 (c) of the Revenue Act
of 1928, the predecessor of section 1001 (b).36 The court found that it
did not have such a fair market value, relying on the fact that the ob-
ligor was an individual who, although wealthy at the time of the transac-
tion, might not be able to meet his obligation to pay in the future. The
son's promise was distinguished from one in which the obligor is a com-
pany engaged in the business of writing annuity contracts, since the latter
would be subject to regulatory requirements which would lend more
certainty to the transaction.3 7
The holding in Lloyd was later followed in Frank C. Deering.38 In
Deering, a father transferred stock to his wife and children in return for
a small amount of cash and their promises to pay him a life annuity. The
father argued and the court agreed that the annuity promise did not have
an ascertainable fair market value. Since the amount of cash received by
the father was less than his basis in the property, no gain was realized by
the father in the year of the transfer. The court noted that even were he
to exceed his life expectancy, there was still no assurance that he would
ever recover his cost since the periodic payments depended upon the future
32. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
38. Id. at 412.
84. Id. at 413.
35. 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936).
36. The language of section 1001 (b) concerning the "amount realized" has
been unchanged since 1924. The present day language was originally enacted in
the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202 (c), 43 Stat. 253.
37. 33 B.T.A. at 905.
38. 40 B.T.A. 984 (1939).
1980]
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financial capabilities of the obligors.3 9 The court emphasized that the ob-
ligors in this case were not "a sound insurance company."40
The Tax Court was not the only court to apply the open transaction
doctrine to the receipt of the obligor's unsecured promise by the an-
nuitant; the Third Circuit did likewise in Evans v. Rothensies41 and
Commissioner v. Kann's Estate.42 In Kann's Estate a mother transferred
securities to her children in exchange for their unsecured promises to pay
her an annuity for life. The court held that where both the annuitant's
life span and the obligor's ability to pay are uncertain, the obligation
should not be ascribed a fair market value. Therefore, the children's
promises were not an "amount realized" by the mother, and she did not
realize a gain in the year the transfer was made. The court held that ob-
ligations of this kind simply did not come within the purview of the statute.
Perhaps because of this unanimity in court decisions, the Internal
Revenue Service withdrew its nonacquiescence to Lloyd in 1950.43 In
1953 it issued Revenue Ruling 239,44 adopting the Lloyd rationale. It
ruled that there was no gain realized on the transfer of appreciated real
property in return for an annuity for life; instead, the annuitant should
defer the taxable event until he had recovered his basis in the property
transferred. Thus, by 1954 it was well-settled that an annuitant could
utilize the cost recovery approach of Burnet and Lloyd to report the in-
come tax consequences of the transfer.
The application of the open transaction doctrine to the private an-
nuitant was an extension of Burnet. In Burnet, there were no fixed an-
nual payments; it was even possible that no payments would ever be made.
Payments to the transferor were solely within the control and discretion
of the obligor. In the private annuity context, on the other hand, the
amount of each annuity payment is fixed, and the ultimate amount to be
received can be approximated by annuity tables. Nevertheless, courts have
determined that the annuitant who receives only the unsecured promise
of a non-insurance company obligor has received something analogous to
the valueless (in terms of section 1001 (b) "fair market value") promise
received by the taxpayer in Burnet. This is because the total amount
ultimately realized by the annuitant is dependent upon the uncertainty
of both his life span and the obligor's continued financial ability to pay.4 5
The uncertainty of an annuitant's life span is of course present in every
annuity transaction, a fact recognized in Lloyd,46 and is an insufficient
39. Id. at 985.
40. Id. at 986.
41. 114 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1940).
42. 174 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1949).
43. 1950-2 C.B. 3.
44. 1953-2 C.B. 53.
45. Commissioner v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1949).
46. 33 B.T.A. 903, 905 (1936).
[Vol. 45
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reason, of itself, to hold a transaction open.47 The additional uncertainty
of the obligor's continued financial capability to pay when his promise
is unsecured is apparently the decisive factor in the characterization of a
private annuity as open, even though that uncertainty to a degree is
present in all unsecured deferred payment transactions.48
Despite the judicial consensus that a private annuity does not have
an ascertainable fair market value, in 1969 the Commissioner issued
Revenue Ruling 69-74.49 This ruling rejects the application of the open
transaction doctrine to private annuities. It adopts the view that the an-
nuity promise, even if unsecured, has a fair market value for purposes of
section 1001 (b) sufficient to require that gain be computed at the time
of the transfer. The ruling computes the gain realized as the difference
between the annuitant-transferor's basis in the property transferred and
the present value of the annuity received, determined from specific
actuarial tables provided in the regulations.5 0 No support for this posi-
tion was cited; in fact, there appears to be none which could have been
cited. In 1971 the Tax Court, in a footnote to Edgar v. Commissioner,51
agreed that the "general rule" was contrary to Revenue Ruling 69-74 in the
case of unsecured private annuities. It was perhaps an indication that
Revenue Ruling 69-74 would not be readily accepted by the courts.
47. Estate of Lloyd G. Bell v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 469, 476 (1973);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 20 (1929).
48. In this context the courts have tended toward a factor-oriented approach
to determine whether the deferred payment contract is the equivalent of cash,
rather than whether it has a fair market value. See Comment, Realization of In-
come in Deferred Payment Sales, 34 Mo. L. Ray. 357, 361, 374 (1969). The private
annuity is also similar in this respect to transactions in which the taxpayer has
acquired highly speculative second mortgage notes at a discount. In this context,
the courts have taken a case by case, factor-oriented approach to determine whether
or not the obligations are so speculative and the degree of risk inherent in the
transaction so high that the amount of profit cannot be fairly determined at the
time of the transaction. Commissioner v. Liftin, 317 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1963); Will-
hoit v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1962); Riss v. Commissioner, 368
F.2d 965 (10th Cir. 1966); Underhill v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 489 (1966).
49. 1969-1 C.B. 43. The Commissioner had previously issued a ruling which
denied an annuitant use of the cost recovery approach where the obligor was an
organization which "from time to time issues annuity contracts." Rev. Rul. 62-136,
1962-2 C.B. 12. Dix v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 313, 316 (4th Cir. 1968), aff'g 46
T.C. 796 (1966), interpreted the "from time to time" language to "embrace only
those organizations which write enough annuity contracts to obtain a good spread
of the actuarial risk." It has also been ruled that annuity contracts issued by such
organizations are sufficiently comparable to individual annuity contracts issued by
commercial insurance companies to justify the application of a similar standard
of valuation. Rev. Rul. 62-137, 1962-2 C.B. 28, supplemented by Rev. Rul. 62-216,
1962-2 C.B. 30, clarified in Rev. Rul. 67-39, 1967-1 C.B. 18, updated in Rev. Rul.
72-438, 1972-2 C.B. 38.
50. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (f) (1958). See also note 8 supra. Although not
explicit, it is apparently the Commissioner's position that the annuity's actuarial
value is also its fair market value for purposes of section 1001 (b). Compare the
majority and dissenting opinions in Estate of Lloyd G. Bell v. Commissioner, 60
T.C. 469 (1973) with 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788 (1978), appeal
dismissed, [1979] Fed. Taxes (P-H) f 61,000 (3d Cir. April 5, 1979).
51. 56 T.C. 717, 742 n.15 (1971).
1980]
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The nonacceptance of Revenue Ruling 69-74 has since been verified
by the proclivity of the courts to either distinguish52 or ignore 5 3 it. In
Estate of Lloyd G. Bell,54 an elderly couple transferred stock in a closely
held farming corporation to their children. In return they received their
children's promises to pay to them one-thousand dollars per month for
so long as either of them should live. The stock was placed in escrow and
the agreement provided for a cognovit judgment in the event of default
as security for the promises. The court refused to pass on the validity of
either Revenue Ruling 239 or 69-74. The transaction before the court was
distinguished simply on the ground that it was "amply secured." Since
the parents had received an annuity which had a "fair market value"5 5
greater than the adjusted basis of the property transferred, the court held
that they had realized a gain. The real issue, said the court, was how this
realized gain should be recognized.5 6
The majority in Bell distinguished earlier cases which had held
that such an annuity contract did not have an ascertainable fair mar-
ket value by pointing to the presence of the security for the promise.
The language of the opinion, however, indicates that an unsecured an-
nuitant might be treated similarly: "It would be manifestly inconsistent to
find that the annuity contract had a fair market value for determining a
taxpayer's cost or investment in the contract under section 72 (c), and yet
to hold it had no determinable value for purposes of section 1001." 5 7
The statement implies that even if the annuity contract were unsecured,
if the court utilized the actuarial value of the contract to determine the
taxpayer's investment, this would close the transaction for purposes of
section 1001. The court would then use that actuarial value as the amount
realized-the fair market value of the contract-by the annuitant. The six
dissenting judges disagreed with the implications of the majority's state-
52. See, e.g., 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788 (1978), appeal dismi.7sed,
[1979] Fed. Taxes (P-H) ff61,000 (3d Cir. April 5, 1979); Estate of Lloyd G. Bell
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
53. See, e.g., Fehrs Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir.
1973), aff'g 58 T.C. 174 (1972); Edgar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 717, 742 n.15
(1971).
54. 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
55. The court found that the annuity's actuarial value was also its fair
market value. See text accompanying notes 68-73 infra.
56. For a discussion of this issue, see text accompanying notes 121-132 infra.
57. 60 T.C. 469, 476 (1973). The court reasoned that for § 72 purposes the
"investment in the contract" in an arm's length transfer is the fair market value
of the property transferred. In an arm's length transaction the value given and
that received will be fairly equal. If the value of the property received is sub-
stantially less than the value of that given, the difference must be considered
a gift attributable to the family relationship. The amount of consideration paid
for the annuity is limited to the actuarial value of the annuity. (Note the re-
semblance to the logic of United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).) Having
ascertained a fair market value for the annuity for purposes of determining the
annuitant's investment in the contract, it would be inconsistent to find it did
not have a fair market value for purposes of § 1001.
[V61. 45
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ment that the "actuarial value of an annuity constitutes its fair market
value in all cases." 58
Revenue Ruling 69-74 was ignored in Fehrs Finance Co. v. Commis-
sioner.5 9 There, a couple owned all of the stock of Fehrs Rental Corpora-
tion (Rental). Their two daughters as sole shareholders formed Fehrs
Finance Company (Finance). The couple then transferred all of the stock
of Rental to Finance in return for a life annuity. Subsequently, Finance
resold all of Rental's stock to Rental for cash and an unsecured promis-
sory note. The issue facing the court was whether the couple had realized
any gain on the redemption transaction. Finance argued that the couple
had realized a gain. It contended that under section 362 the amount of
that gain should be added to its basis in the stock of Rental, with the re-
sult that Finance realized less gain, if any at all, on the subsequent'sale
of the stock back to Rental.
The Tax Court disagreed, however, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
The Tax Court found that the making of the annuity contracts did not
constitute distributions of property under section 301. It ruled tht the
annuities were not the equivalent of cash and did not have ascertainable
fair market values. The court pointed out that the death of either the
mother or the father would terminate the obligation, and emphasized the
fledgling nature of the corporate obligor.60 The Eighth Circuit dis-
tinguished Bell as involving a secured annuity; incorrectly, it noted that
the corporate obligors in Bell were viable, established corporations, when
actually the obligors in Bell were the two children of the annuitants and
their spouses. The corporate obligor in Fehrs was newly formed, had a total
capitalization of $100,000 plus an unsecured promissory note, and yet was
obligated to pay out $70,000 per year. 61 The case is interesting for its ap-
parent disregard of 69-74 when the annuity promise is unsecured, at least
where the question is whether there have been distributions of property
within the meaning of section 301 rather than whether there has been an
amount realized under section 1001 (b). It suggests that when the obligor is
a corporation rather than an individual, courts may look to its financial
stability as a factor in determining whether the obligation given the an-
nuitant has an ascertainable fair market value. In an earlier decision the
financial condition of the obligor had not been considered a factor when
the obligor was an individual. 62
58. 60 T.C. 469, 476 (1973) (Simpson, J., dissenting).
59. 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'g 58 T.C. 174 (1972).
60. 58 T.C. at 190-92.
61. 487 F.2d at 190.
62. J. Darsie Lloyd v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 903, 905 (1936). In that
case the obligor was a wealthy comedian. The court said:
But here a new element enters the computation, the uncertainty as to
whether or not the one agreeing to make payments will be able to make
them as agreed when the time for payments actually arrives. This dif-
ficulty might not be so great in the case of a sound insurance company
regularly engaged in granting annuities or, perhaps, in the case of a
1980]
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In 1978 the Tax Court once again was confronted with the issue of
whether an annuity promise had a fair market value for purposes of sec-
tion 1001 (b). In 212 Corp.63 an elderly couple transferred property to a
newly formed corporation, 212 Corporation, in return for a joint and
survivor annuity. The corporation, owned by two sons and a son-in-law of
the couple, then leased the property to the Arthur F. Schultz Company
(Schultz), which was wholly owned by the husband. The scheme was for
Schultz to rent the property from 212 Corporation, which would then use
the rentals to pay the annuity as well as taxes and insurance on the prop-
erty. The court found that the parties had entered the transaction of their
own volition, that the price had been set by the husband, that the rents
to be paid by Schultz were calculated and expected to be sufficient to
fund the annuity, and that 212 Corporation had no other source of in-
come. As security for the transaction the parties agreed that the annuity
payments would be a charge upon rents and profits of 212 Corporation
from property conveyed to it; that 212 Corporation could not mortgage or
sell any of the property without first obtaining the annuitants' consent;
and that 212 Corporation would authorize a confession of judgment
against it in the event of default.
The majority of the court, following Bell, held that the transaction
was "closed" and that the entire gain was taxable in the year the exchange
was made. The opinion utilized the actuarial value of the annuity as the
amount realized (the "fair market value" of the annuity promise) by the
annuitant for the purpose of computing gain realized under section
1001 (b).64 One dissent found that the annuity promise did not have an
ascertainable fair market value.65 It disagreed with the majority's use of
actuarial tables to determine the annuity's fair market value, attacking
the notion that it was inconsistent to find a "fair market value" for pur-
poses of section 72 while finding no "determinable" value for purposes of
section 1001.60
In sum, these cases indicate that a private annuitant should not re-
tain security for the obligor's promise. Even though one case deemed the
transaction to be open despite the retention of some security interest, 67
keeping a security interest risks immediate gain recognition on the trans-
bank. . . . Laws have been enacted to safeguard investors of such in-
stitutions. But that kind of an annuity is not involved in this case.
Harold C. Lloyd [the obligor] was an individual. He was wealthy in 1930
but he was not engaged in the business of granting annuities, and his in-
vestments were not subject to restrictions and supervision as are those
of insurance companies and banks.
63. 70 T.C. 788 (1978).
64. Id. at 798-802.
65. Id. at 804 (Fay, J., dissenting). Evans v. Rothensies, 114 F.2d 958 (3d
Cir. 1940), was relied upon for this conclusion. There, even though 2,956 of
3,000 shares transferred were placed in escrow as security for the annuity, the
court found that the annuity had no ascertainable fair market value.
66. 70 T.C. at 806 n.5 (Fay, J., dissenting).
67. Evans v. Rothensies, 114 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1940).
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fer of appreciated property. The private annuitant should also be aware
of Revenue Ruling 69-74 and the implications of the majority opinions
in Bell and 212 Corp. If their approach is applied, the private annuity
will be deemed dosed even where there is no security for the obligor's
promise. Fehrs Finance offers some authority for the proposition that in
the Eighth Circuit no gain is realized on the transfer if the annuitant re-
ceives only the unsecured promise of the obligor and if the obligor is a
corporation of questionable financial stability.
The annuitant should also consider that he may be required to in-
clude an actuarial value of the annuity promise, whether secured or not,
as its fair market value for purposes of determining the amount of gain
realized under section 1001 (b). This holds true despite the fact its actuarial
value. may bear little relation to its actual value in the market (if, indeed,
there is a market for private annuity contracts). While it is generally ac-
cepted that actuarial tables are an appropriate method of valuing obliga-
tions when the only major contingency is the length of the recipient's life
(i.e., a secured private annuity),68 the additional contingency present in
the case of unsecured annuities of the obligor's future ability to pay is not
accounted for by actuarial tables. Its presence would mean that the fair
market value of the promise would be an amount discounted below its
actuarial value.69 The observation made by the majority opinion in Bell
that it would be inconsistent to "find that the annuity contract had a
fair market value for purposes of determining a taxpayer's cost or invest-
ment in the contract under section 72 (c), and yet to hold it had no de-
terminable value for purposes of section 1001,"70 is not persuasive. It is
questionable whether the taxpayer's investment in the private annuity
contract should be determined according to the value of the property he
received in exchange. 71 Further, section 72 and section 1001 address
68. See note 47 supra. But see 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788, 804
(1978) (Fay, J., dissenting).
69. The position of Rev. Rul. 69-74 cannot rest on the same inconsistency
relied on by the majority in Bell and adopted sub silentio in 212 Corp., i.e.,
that it would be inconsistent to find that the annuity promise had a fair market
value for purposes of determining the annuitant's investment in the contract
under § 72 (c), but that it did not have a fair market value for purposes of
§ 1001 (b). See notes 57-58, 65-66, 68 and accompanying text supra; see notes
70-73 and accompanying text infra. This is because Rev. Rul. 69-74 ruled that
the annuitant could only include his adjusted basis in the property transferred
as his investment in the contract, rather than its fair market value. Whether
the actuarial value of the annuity would equal the amount for which a willing
seller and buyer would exchange the property, each fully aware of the facts and
under no pressure, is purely a matter of chance. In fact, the long-standing judicial
position has been that the unsecured private annuity contract does not have an
ascertainable fair market value for purposes of § 1001 (b). See text accompanying
notes 35-43 supra.
70. 60 T.C. at 476.
71. The approach used for valuing the investment in the contract seems
to be based on the "presumptively equal" approach of United States v. Davis, 370
U.S. 65 (1962). There, pursuant to a property settlement executed prior to a
divorce, a husband transferred appreciated property to his wife in return for
1980]
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different issues. 72 In other contexts, courts have found that the fact that the
promise given to the annuitant had a fair market value for one purpose
the release of her marital rights. The Court found that the exchange was a
taxable event. Therefore, it was required to determine the amount of gain realized
by the husband on the transfer. The problem which faced the Court was how to
value the marital rights released by the wife-the amount realized by the hus-
band. The Court found that:
Absent a readily ascertainable value it is accepted practice where property
is exchanged to hold.., that the values "of the two properties exchanged
in an arms-length transaction are either equal in fact, or are presumed to.
be equal." [O]nce it is recognized that the transfer was a taxable event, it
is more consistent with the general purpose and scheme of the taxing.
statutes to make a rough approximation of the gain realized thereby. than:
to ignore altogether its tax consequences.
Id. at 72-73. In Davis, once the exchange was made the parties' relationshili in
connection with the exchange ended. This is not true of the private annuity
where the parties' relationship continues. If the promise is unsecured, the ultimate
amount to be received by the annuitant is dependent upon both his life span
and the continued financial capabilities of the obligor. The Davis principles are
further distinguishable in both Bell and 212 Corp. where the annuities were
found to be amply secured. In Davis, the exchange was made at arm's length.
In Bell, on the other hand, the court specifically found that a gift element was
present; and in 212 Corp. the court found that the sale price had been s&t by
the annuitant.
72. Section 72 addresses the reporting of income flowing from the annuity
itself. It provides a mathematical formula that allows the annuitant to report any
income derived from the annuity over his life expectancy. It was designed to
relieve the annuitant of the unfairness which resulted under the 1939 Code.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. -
AD. Nxws 4621, 4640. Section 1001 addresses the realization and recognition of
gain on the disposition of property which has appreciated in value. The gain
realized is to be recognized except as elsewhere provided in the Code. The Tegula-
tions indicate that this exception clause does not refer to § 72. Treas.. Reg.
§ 1.1002-1 (1957).
Section 72 is premised upon expected return over an actuarial life expectancy.
The annuitant is allowed to recover the consideration paid for the annuity tax-
free over the period of his life expectancy, after which he receives tax-free' that
portion of each annuity payment which had previously represented a recovery
of the consideration paid for the annuity. In the absence of a gift element, the
full consideration paid for the annuity is the fair market value of the property
transferred.
The open transaction doctrine (§ 1001) is based upon the ultimate actual
return. If the fair market value of that which is received (the annuity promise)
cannot be fairly determined, then the annuitant may first recover his basis'in
the property transferred before reporting any gain.
It has been noted that it is inconsistent to determine a fair market value
for the annuity promise received and to use that value to determine the an-
nuitant's investment in the contract for purposes of the § 72 exclusion ratio, while
not finding a fair market value for the annuity promise received for purposes of
the amount realized under § 1001. Estate of Lloyd G. Bell v. Commissioner, 60
T.C. 469, 476 (1973); Croft & Hipple, Planning Lifetime Property Transfers:
Private Annuities, Installment Sales and Gift-Leasebacks, 11 REAL PROP., PRoB.
& TR. J. 253, 264 (1976). This apparent inconsistency could be a result of the
fact that both the exclusion ratio of § 72 and the open transaction doctrine of
§ 1001 are designed to afford the taxpayer fair income tax treatment. It may not
be unfair to value the annuitant's investment in the contract according to an
actuarial "fair market value" of the annuity received, since § 72 deals in ex-
pectancies. Also, since § 72 is to the annuitant's benefit and some value must, be
[Vol. 45
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did not prevent a finding that it did not have an ascertainable fair market
value,.for purposes of section 1001 (b).73
B. The Equivalent of Cash Doctrine
Section 451 (a) of the Code74 specifies that an item of gross income
is included in gross income for the year of receipt unless the accounting
method of computing taxable income elected by the taxpayer specifies a
different period. Section 44675 allows a taxpayer to elect among several ac-
counting' methods of computing taxable income, subject only to the
basis on which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his
books, and, if he has no regular method or the method used does not
dearly reflect income, the method prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury.76 Section 446 (c) specifically lists the cash receipts and disburse-
ments method as one permissible method.
Ordinarily, individual taxpayers utilize the cash receipts and disburse-
ments method.71 The cash basis taxpayer reports as income for the tax-
able year any cash received, as well as any property (other than cash) re-
ceived which is either the "equivalent of cash" or "constructively re-
ceived." 78 The latter doctrine requires the taxpayer to report as income
an item which is subject to his "unconditional capacity to reduce to pos-
session," even though he has not physically received the item. 79 Generally,
the equivalent of cash doctrine requires the taxpayer to report as income
property received which, like money, is "freely and easily negotiable so
that it readily passes from hand to hand in commerce." 80 Stated otherwise,
the property must be "readily convertible into cash." 8'
given, :the investment in the contract, the contract's actuarial "fair market value"
may be as good as any. However, especially if the contract is unsecured, its
actuarial value may bear very little relation to its fair market value. The valua-
tion of.the contract for purposes of § 1001 carries with it an additional conse-
quence. Since the transaction is closed, the annuitant faces the possibility that a
cour t will treat as ordinary income any amounts subsequently received which
exceed the discounted amount included as the fair market value of the annuity.
See. notes 146-151 and accompanying text infra.
. 73. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 411, 412 (1931) (contract found to have
a fair ,market value for purposes of federal estate tax, but not for purposes of
determining gain); Estate of Hurlburt v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1286 (1956)
(contracts found to have a fair market value for purposes of state inheritance
tax, -but not for purposes of determining gain).
74. I.R.C. § 451 (a).
75. I.R.C. § 446.
76. I.R.C. § 446 (a), (b).
.77. 2 J. MERTENs, supra note 30, § 10.01.
78. See id. § 11.01. Compare United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.),
cert, ,denied, 340 U.S. 821 (1950) with Anastasio v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814,
817 (1977) (economic benefit theory).
. 79. Schniers v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 511 (1977); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-,(1)
(a) (1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.451- (2) (a) (1957); 2 J. MERTENs, supra note 30, § 10.01.
80. Western Oaks Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 365, 377 (1968);
Estate of Ennis v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 799, 802 (1955); Ennis v. Commissioner,
17 T.C. 465 (1951).
-81. Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427, 439 (4th Cir. 1978) (Wintee, J.,
.1980]
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The private annuitant initially receives, as part or all of the con-
sideration for his transfer of property, the obligor-transferee's promise to
pay fixed, periodic sums. In this regard the private annuity is analogous
to other deferred payment transactions to which the courts have applied
a cash equivalency test, rather than a mere "fair market value" test, to
determine whether the promise received constitutes an amount realized
by the cash basis taxpayer under section 1001 (b).82 Traditionally, courts
dissenting); Edelman v. United States, 329 F.2d 950, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1964);. Watson,
Jr. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 544, 549 (1978). See also Estate of Lloyd G. Bell v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 469, 477 (1973) (dissenting opinion) (the obligation must be
readily transferable in commerce).
The government may claim that under the economic benefit theory income
must be reported in the year the property is received despite the fact that the
property fails to meet the requirements of the equivalent of cash doctrine. In
United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 841
(1950), an officer and director of a corporation received from the corporation
an annuity contract which named him as the annuitant. The court found that the
policy was to remain in the company's possession until the taxpayer reached age
65, that the taxpayer's salary was not decreased because of the purchase of- the
annuity contract, that the taxpayer was not given the option to receive cash, and
that as long as the company retained possession of the contract the taxpayer
could not accelerate the date when monthly payments should commence'. The
contract was not assignable, was free from claims of creditors, and was not
salable; it had no cash surrender value, no loan value, and did not entitle the
annuitant to a distribution of surplus. The Second Circuit found that the tax-
payer had received income which he was required to report because he had
"received as compensation for prior services something of economic benefit
which he had not previously had." Id. at 865.
The economic benefit doctrine is distinguishable in the private annuity con-
text. The doctrine appears to be a peculiarity of the 'employer-employee'relatibn-
ship. See, e.g., McEwen v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1018 (1946). But see Anastasio v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814 (1977). Further, the doctrine does not concern the
amount realized under § 1001 (b); it addresses only § 61 gross income..
82. Comment, supra note 48, at 361, 374. The justification for this ap-
proach is that it would be inconsistent to require a cash basis taxpayer to in-
clude as an amount realized property which is not the equivalent of cash and
thus not income to him.* Johnston v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 560 (1950). "In
Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 663, 668 (1973), rev'd, 524 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1975), the Tax Court refused to close a transaction because the promise
received by the transferor was found not to be the equivalent of cash. The court
added that it would be unfair to require the taxpayer to report all the gain in
the year the contract was made and thus pay the tax before receiving the deferred
payments. It stated that the amount of capital gain on the transfer would be
permanently limited to the difference between the taxpayer's basis and the dis-
counted value of the promise received (the amount realized).
It is not clear whether the taxpayer's method of reporting income stems
from the realization section, § 1001 (b). In Western Oaks Bldg. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 49 T.C. 365 (1968), an accrual method taxpayer was required to in-
clude the face amount of the contract rather than its fair market value as the
amount realized. There is some indication that § 1001 (c)'s recognition provision
brings the taxpayer's method of reporting into play. This latter approach is sup-
ported by Watson v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 544, 548-49 (1978), in which the
court said:
Section 1001 (a) provides that the gain from the sale of property shall
be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the property's ad-
justed basis. ...
For cash basis taxpayers ... this section 1002 [now section 1001 (c)]
[Vol. 45
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have held that if the deferred payments are evidenced by a contract, and
no notes, mortgages, or other evidence of indebtedness are given or ac-
cepted as part of the transaction, the contract is not the equivalent of cash.8 3
Also, the obligation must be negotiable to be considered the equivalent of
cash and thus included as an amount realized.8 4 Because a mere contract
to make deferred payments was not considered the equivalent of cash, it
did not constitute an amount realized to the cash basis taxpayer. There-
fore, the transferor-recipient of an unsecured deferred payment promise
was able to defer reporting any gain on the transfer until he had received
cash or its equivalent which exceeded his basis in the property transferred.
In practical effect, this allowed the taxpayer to use the cost recovery
method of Burnet, albeit for a different reason.
Recently, this approach has come under attack. A requirement of
"negotiability" has been rejected by some courts and seems to be out-
moded as a per se test of cash equivalency.8 5 The trend appears to be in
the direction of a factor-oriented approach which emphasizes the obliga-
tion's liquidity. This is exemplified by Cowden v. Commissioner,86 in
which the court adopted the following test for determining whether a
promise to pay is the equivalent of cash:
[I]f a promise to pay of a solvent obligor is unconditional and
assignable, not subject to set-offs, and is of a kind that is fre-
quently transferred to lenders or investors at a discount not sub-
stantially greater than the generally prevailing premium for the
use of money, such promise is the equivalent of cash and taxable
in like manner as cash would have been taxable had it been
received by the taxpayer rather than the obligation.8 7
This test was adopted by the Tax Court in its opinion in Warren Jones
Co. v. Commissioner,88 but the court went on to find that the amount of
discount required to transfer the deferred payment contract was too great
to allow a finding of cash equivalence.8 9
exception brings into play section 451 (a) .... Under the accompanying
section 1.451-1 (a), Income Tax Regs., a cash basis taxpayer shall include
in gross income amounts "when actually or constructively received."
We hold that the Irrevocable Banker's Letter of Credit . . . was
"property" which had a "fair market value" within the meaning of sec-
tion 1001 (b). . . . [I]t was equivalent to cash.
83. Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961) (oil, gas, and
mineral lease); Edgar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 717, 744 (1971) (sale of stock);
Western Oaks Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 365, 376, 377 (1968) (sale of
real estate); Estate of Hurlburt v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1286, 1288 (1956) (sale
of real estate); Johnston v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 560, 565 (1950) (sale of stock).
84. Western Oaks Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 365, 377 (1968);
Ennis v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 465, 470 (1951).
85. Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961); Warren Jones
Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788, 790 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975); Heller Trust v. Com-
missioner, 382 F.2d 675, 681 (9th Cir. 1967).
86. 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
87. Id. at 24.
88. 60 T.C. 663 (1973), rev'd, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975).
89. Id. at 668-70.
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More fundamental (and drastic) are indications that the equivalent
of cash doctrine may be abandoned as the test of whether a promise to
pay constitutes an amount realized under section 1001 (b) in favor of a
fair market value test. The primary force behind this latest development
has been the Ninth Circuit, although its position may have been spawned
to a large extent by the inconsistencies in Tax Court decisions.90 On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit in Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner1 held that
if the fair market value of a deferred payment obligation received :in an
exchange could be ascertained, that fair market value must be included
as an amount realized in the year it is received.
The several opinions written by the members of both the Tax Court
and the Ninth Circuit in Warren Jones illustrate the difficult questions
and conflicting interpretations concerning the interrelationship of the
open transaction doctrine, the equivalent of cash doctrine, and sections
1001, 61, 446, 451, and 453 of the Code. The case involved a cash basis
taxpayer who sold an apartment building for $153,000, receiving $20,000
in cash and an unsecured9 2 contractual promise to pay $1,000 plus eight
percent interest per month for fifteen years. The balance was due in a
lump sum payment at the end of the fifteen year term. The court found
that the contract could have been sold at an eleven percent discount, pro-
vided the transferor of the contract would have been willing to deposit
$41,000 of the discounted sale price in escrow in order to secure the first
90. The logic of Johnston v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 560, 564 (1950), was set
out as follows: "The petitioner is on a cash basis and to realize gain must receive
during the taxable year cash or its equivalent in excess of his basis before he can
have any taxable gain." (Emphasis added.)
,The court in Western Oaks Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 365, 376-77
(1968) stated:
In determining the income derived from the sale of property by a cash
method taxpayer, a right to receive future income is not included in the
computation of the "amount realized" under Section 1001 (b) unless that
right is the equivalent of cash .... This is true even though for other
purposes that right may be considered to have a fair market value ....
Where the right is the equivalent of cash, it is included in the income of a
cash method taxpayer in the year of receipt at its fair market value.
But see Clodfelter v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 694, 700 (1967), afrd, 426 F.2d
1391 (9th Cir. 1970), where the court said: "Also, these and related provisions
[Sections 1001, 1002, and 453] make it clear the amount of any gain from a
sale . . .must be determined as of the time of the sale, irrespective of whether
the seller is on the cash or accrual basis .. "
Similarly, in Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. 1663, 1669 (1965),
aff'd, 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967), the court stated:
The question is not ... whether the contracts are negotiable instruments
but whether ... we can determine a fair market value for these contracts
at the time they were received from purchasers of the duplexes. ...[W]e find . . . that the contracts had a fair market value when
received ... and that they are includable in petitioner's taxable income
at that fair market value in the year of sale.
91. 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975), revg 60 T.C. 663 (1973).
92. But see Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 663, 673 (1973)(Quealy, J., dissenting).
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41,000. of payments by the buyer. This meant that the transferor could
have readily converted into cash only $76,980 of the $133,000 face value
of the contract. The seller's adjusted basis in the apartment building was
$61,913.34. The court also found that the purchaser was solvent, that the
only evidence of the indebtedness was the contract, that such contracts
were regularly bought and sold in the locality, that funds and buyers
were available in the local area for investment in this type of contract,
and that the contract had an ascertainable fair market value.
The taxpayer argued that he had not realized any gain in the year
of the sale since his adjusted basis in the property was greater than the
amount of cash received. He contended that the contract for deferred
payments was not an amount realized in the year the sale was effected
since it was not the equivalent of cash. The Commissioner, on the other
hand, argued the contract was the equivalent of cash since it had an
ascertainable fair market value and was readily marketable. He contended
that it was "property (other than money)" under section 1001 (b) and to
the extent of its fair market value constituted an amount realized. The
argument logically followed that because the cash received plus the fair
market value of the contract exceeded the taxpayer's adjusted basis in
the asset transferred, the taxpayer had realized a gain which he was re-
quired to recognize in the year of the transfer. The Tax Court agreed
with the taxpayer, holding that the amount of discount required to
sell the contract was too great to allow a finding of cash equivalence. 93
It concluded that to include the contract as an amount realized would
be contrary to the cash basis taxpayer's method of reporting income; the
contract had no tax significance to the taxpayer. 94 The opinion is con-
sistent with the manner in which the courts have traditionally approached
the computation of a cash basis taxpayer's amount realized under section
1001, only if the obligor's promise to make future payments is the equiva-
lent of cash is it included at its fair market value as an amount realized. 95
A concurring opinion disagreed with the majority's analysis. It
posited that the issue turned on whether the contract was "property re-
ceived" by the taxpayer on the sale and not whether the contract was the
equivalent of cash. If it was "property received," then it must be included
at its fair market value as part of the amount realized by the taxpayer on
the sale. This differs from the majority's view that if the contract is the
equivalent of cash, it is included at its fair market value as part of the
amount realized by the taxpayer. The test for the determination of
whether the contract is "property received" appears to be whether it is
"sufficiently marketable or has a fair market value sufficiently ascertain-
able as to constitute 'property' within the meaning of section 1001 (b)."96
93. Id. at 668.
94. Id. at 669-70.
95. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
96. Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 663, 670 (1973).
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This approach appears to combine features of both the open transaction
doctrine and the equivalent of cash doctrine.97
A dissenting opinion refused to analyze the facts in terms of whether
the contract received by the taxpayer was the equivalent of cash.9 8
Rather, it analyzed the facts solely in terms of whether the sale was
"closed" or "open," that determination depending upon several factors
of which marketability was the most important.9 Another dissent con-
cluded that the majority's "cash equivalence" test for determining whether
a contract is an amount realized under section 1001 (b) was wholly un-
justified.100 It took the position that because a willing buyer would pur-
chase the contract, albeit for a discounted amount, it must be included
as an amount realized in the year the sale was made.
In reversing the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily 6i a
statutory analysis of section 1001 and the enactment of section 453 of the
97. The "sufficiently marketable" language connotes cash equivalency while
the "has a fair market value sufficiently ascertainable as to constitute 'property'"
language is merely a definition of property received which passes muster under
the open transaction doctrine. The sentence is written in the disjunctive, but it
is unclear whether the dissent is saying that a finding of either is sufficient or
that they are identical standards.
This "property received" test is developed more fully in Comment, The Doc-
trine of Cash Equivalency as Illustrated by Land Sale Contracts and Notes Re-
ceived for Services Rendered, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 219, 241-43 (1974), where
the writer says that it is supported by congressional debate, revenue rulings, and
court decisions. Marketability and convertibility into cash are noted as being
the two requisites to a finding of "property received." But the concurring opinion
in Warren Jones found that the contract was not "property received," even though
the court found that the contract was marketable and immediately convertible
into cash. It is difficult to see under these definitions of the "property received"
test how a conclusion contrary to that which would result under a "cash equiva-
lency" standard could be reached. A "property received" test merely begs the
question of what is "property received" under § 1001 (b).
98. Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 663, 670-73 (1973) (Tan-
nenwald, J., dissenting).
99. Marketability is the key factor in the determination of whether an ob-
ligation received is the equivalent of cash. The open transaction doctrine addresses
the issue of whether the obligation received by the taxpayer has an ascertainable
fair market -value for purposes of § 1001 (b). It requires that all circumstances be
reviewed to ascertain whether the ultimate amount to be received under the ob-
ligation is sufficiently certain so that, in fairness, the taxpayer can be required
to calculate gain immediately upon its receipt. It applies whether the taxpayer
uses the cash or accrual method of reporting income. It appears that the dissent
in Warren Jones is trying to add to the open transaction equation a factor.which
could be applicable only to the cash basis taxpayer.
Under this approach, the private annuitant can arguably defer gain realiza-
tion on the ground that the promise, whether or not secured, is not market;ble.
As the dissent said, marketability "implies a recognizable group of prospective
buyers so that it can be said that the property is of a type that 'commonly change[s]
hands in commerce."' Id. at 671 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting), quoting Johnston
v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 560, 565 (1950). Note that this is the definition of
"equivalent of cash." See cases cited at note 80 supra.
100. 60 T.C. at 673, 674 (1973) (Quealy, J., dissenting).
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Code.1 0 ' It concluded that section 1001 requires that "if the fair market
value of property received in an exchange can be ascertained, that fair
market value must be reported as an amount realized." 10 2 It is an interpre-
tation of section 1001 which the Internal Revenue Service long had ad-
vocated, but with little or no success. s03 The opinion also cites several de-
cisions which purportedly support its position; 10 4 in fact, all are dis-
tinguishable. Some of these cases merely support a broad definition of
what constitutes income to a cash basis taxpayer; 105 others do not discuss
101. 524 F.2d at 791, 792 (1975). The court said that the question presented
was essentially one of statutory construction. Id. at 791 n.6. The predecessor of
§ 1001 (b) was § 202 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1919, ch. 18, § 202 (b), 40 Stat.
1057, 1060. It provided: "When property is exchanged for other property, the
property received in exchange shall for the purpose of determining gain or loss
be treated as the equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market value ...."
The Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202 (c), 42 Stat. 227, 230, changed the
section to provide: "On an exchange of property, real, personal or mixed, for any
other such property, no gain or loss shall be recognized unless the property re-
ceived in exchange has a readily realizable market value ...."
Congress once again changed the language in the Revenue Act of 1924, ch.
234, § 202 (c), 43 Stat. 253, this time to the language which now appears in
§ 1001 (b): "The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property
shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the prop-
erty (other than money) received."
The court in Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner concluded that:
There is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to retain the
"readily realizable market value" test from the 1921 statute as an un-
stated element of the 1924 Act.... We cannot avoid the conclusion that
in 1924 Congress intended to establish the more definite rule . . . if the
fair market value of property received in an exchange can be ascertained,
that fair market value must be reported as an amount realized.
524 F.2d at 792.
102. 524 F.2d 788, 792 (1975). At least one commentator has reached a con-
trary conclusion. Comment, The Doctrine of Cash Equivalency as Illustrated by
Land Sale Contracts and Notes Received for Services Rendered, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
Rav. 219, 239 (1974), states: "This section [present day § 1001 (b)] could be
viewed as the current forward point of a continuing congressional desire to be
less rigorous in taxing property exchanges by taxing only such property that can
be considered the equivalent of cash."
It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit did not need to go as far as it did
in its holding. It could have merely held that since the contract was marketable and
had a fair market value, it was the equivalent of cash and therefore an amount
realized under § 1001 (b), despite the fact it was readily marketable only at a
substantial discount. See Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. 1663 (1965),
afrd, 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967), in which it was held that the deferred pay-
ment contracts had a fair market value of 50% and to that extent were includable
in the taxpayer's income in the year of sale.
103. Comment, supra note 102, at 239, 240.
104. 524 F.2d at 793, 794.
105. In Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967), the tax-
payer-seller was required to include as income in the year he had sold duplexes
the fair market value (50% of face value) of deferred payment contracts given
by the purchasers. The case does not stand for the proposition that if the con-
tract received has an ascertainable fair market value, that fair market Yalue
must be reported as an amount realized. The decision specifically finds that the
contracts were income (cash or its equivalent) to the cash basis taxpayer. There-
fore, they were included at their fair market value as an amount realized.
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the .impact of the equivalent of cash doctrine on section 1001 (b), appar-
ently because the obligation involved was not a mere contractual promise
of the obligor and therefore was clearly the equivalent of cash.106
More convincing is the court's discussion of section 453 of the Code.10 7
The. court found this section to be intended to relieve taxpayers of any
hardships imposed on them by section 1001 (b). With regard to those dis-
positions which do not qualify for section 453 treatment, the court quoted
from a 1926 Senate Report on the Revenue Act of 1926:
[D]eferred-payment contracts .. .are to be regarded as the
equivalent of cash if such obligations have a fair market value.
'In consequence, that portion of the initial payment and of the
fair market value of such obligations which represents profits is
to be returned as income as of the taxable year of the sale.' 08
This language offers strong support for the court's decision. It is un-
clear, however, why this language had not previously been applied to an
interpretation of the general realization and recognition rules of section
1001-at least in a deferred payment context-even though it had been on
the books since 1926. The court also claims that its conclusion does not
conflict with that of Cowden v. Commissioner.0 9 While this may be true,
the logic employed in the two cases cannot be reconciled. The Ninth Cir-
cuit would, at best, find that any property with a fair market value is
the equivalent of cash for purposes of section 1001 (b) to the extent of
its fair market value. 1 0 Cowden, on the other hand, clearly 'gives the
equi alent of cash doctrine a primary role in the determination of the
amount realized under section 1001 (b): "[I]f a consideration . . . is the
equivalent of cash it will be subjected to taxation to the extent of its
fair market value.""'
.This same dichotomy has surfaced in the area of private annuities.
Early decisions dealing with the realization and recognition of gain by
the private annuitant held that the obligor's unsecured promise had no
ascertainable fair market value, thus entitling the annuitant to use the
cost recovery approach of Burnet."12 The courts did not concern them-
selves with the issue of cash equivalence, apparently because even if the
contract were considered to be the equivalent of cash, it did not have a
fair market value which could be included as an amount realized. The
decisions were phrased in terms of the open transaction doctrine, but
106. E.g., In re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1975) (installment payment
contract secured by a first mortgage).
107. This section was originally enacted in the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27,
§ 212 (d), 44 Stat. 23.
108. 524 F.2d at 792, 793, quoting from S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.(1926),, reproduced at 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 332, 347. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6
(1958).
109. Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
110. 524 F.2d at 791 n.6.
111. Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 23 (5th Cir. 1961).
112. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
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were replete with phraseology indicative of the cash equivalency doctrine.
This failure to keep the two doctrines distinct was usually of no conse-
quence, since in the great majority of cases a contract which does not
have an ascertainable fair market value is also not the equivalent of cash.
In two recent Tax Court cases, however, the dissent argued that a mere
determination that the contract has an ascertainable fair market value
is not sufficient to require that it be included as an amount realized
without a further finding that it is also the equivalent of cash. In
Estate of Lloyd G. Bell,113 the majority refused to allow the taxpayer to
use the cost recovery approach of Burnet. The opinion made no reference
to the equivalent of cash doctrine. 114 The six dissenting judges agreed that
the presence of the security interest could provide a basis for distinguishing
J. Darsie Lloyd, but refused to join in the opinion that therefore gain Was
automatically required to be reported in the year of the transfer. The dis-
sent stated that the promise received also had to be the equivalent of
cash, and concluded that because of the "peculiar characteristics" of the
private annuity, the obligor's promise could not be considered the equiva-
lent of cash.
The same issue again confronted the Tax Court in 212 Corp.," 5
in which the majority followed Bell. Again, six judges dissented,1 16 be-
lieving that even if the obligation received has an ascertainable fair
market value, that fair market value is realized by a cash basis tax-
payer only if the obligation is the equivalent of cash. It is unclear from
the dissenting opinions, however, what effect a finding of no cash equiva-
lency would have on the realization and recognition of gain by the an-
nuitant. Although five dissenting judges stated that a cash basis taxpayer
does not include a contract as an amount realized unless it is the equiva-
lent of cash, and then proceeded to find that the annuity contract was not
the equivalent of cash, they also required the annuitant to report gain im-
mediately, albeit pro rata over his remaining life expectancy. Only one of
the dissenters"17 appeared to recognize this inconsistency and reach the
proper conclusion that if the contract were found not to be the equivalent
of cash, the taxpayer should report any gain under the cost recovery method.
In light of the foregoing statements, the annuitant probably should not rely
113. 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
114. The majority found that the secured annuity promise had an ascertain-
able fair market value equal to its actuarial value. Although there was no find-
ing or discussion of cash equivalence, it is questionable whether even a secured
private annuity promise is the equivalent of cash. Thus, it seems as if the ma-jority of the Tax Court would apply a fair market value test to determine
whether a private annuity contract is an amount realized under § 1001 (b). The
decision may be even more significant than that in Warren Jones Co. v. Com-
missioner, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975), since in Warren Jones there was a spe-
cific finding that the contracts were marketable.
115. 70 T.C. 788 (1978).
116. Judge Fay wrote one dissent. Id. at 804. Judge Simpson wrote another
in which four judges concurred. Id. at 810.
117. Id. at 804, 810 (Fay, J., dissenting).
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on the equivalent of cash doctrine to defer the realization and -recogni-
tion of gain, despite the fact the annuity promise is probably not the
equivalent of cash. Traditionally, courts have not analyzed the private
annuity in terms of the equivalent of cash doctrine, and they do not seem
willing:to do so in the future.118 Revenue Ruling 69-74119 ignores the
taxpayer's method of reporting income. In addition, it is questionable
whether the courts will continue to apply any cash equivalence test to
section 1001 (b) of the Code. The annuitant can at least argue that even
under the fair market value test followed by the Ninth Circuit in Warren
Jones, the transaction should be held open and that income should be
reported from the sale by the cost recovery method. This should hold
true even if the annuity is secured because in Warren Jones the contract
was found to be marketable and to have a fair market value. While the
private annuity contract may have a fair market value if it is secured,
it still may not be marketable. If it is not marketable, the transaction
falls outside the facts of Warren Jones and arguably should be held open.
Bell and 212 Corp., however, refused to accept this argument in a secured
private annuity context where there was no finding of marketability. 2 0
C. Section 72 Proration of Gain
It should be apparent by now that if the private annuity is held
open the annuitant may use the cost recovery method to report any
gain on the transfer. The question which then arises is whether the an-
nuitant must report the entire amount of gain realized in the year the
property is transferred if the transaction is closed. The authorities are in
conflict, partially because of the uncertain impact of the cash equivalency
doctrine.
In Revenue Ruling 69-74121 the Commissioner ruled that a trans-
action in which the taxpayer received an unsecured private annuity in
exchange for the transfer of appreciated property was closed. However,
the annuitant was only required to report a portion of the realized gain
in the year of the transfer. The applicable portion of the ruling states:
118. See 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788 (1978); Estate of Lloyd G.
Bell v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 469 (1973); note 114 supra.
119. 1969-1 C.B. 43.
120. See text accompanying notes 115-114 supra. If the taxpayer's method of
reporting income is not relevant to a determination of his amount realized under
§ 1001 (b), consistency would require an accrual method taxpayer to include the
fair market value rather than the face value of the contract. See Western Oaks
Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 365 (1968). But see Rev. Rul. 79-292,
1979-39 I.R.B. 18, in which the Service ruled that an accrual basis taxpayer must
include the face amount, rather than the fair market value, of a note received
as an amount realized from the sale of a home. It was noted that valuing the
note and treating it as property received at its fair market value "would be in-
consistent with the well-established principle that an accrual method taxpayer
includes in income amounts which it has a right to receive."
121. 1969-1 C.B. 43.
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The gain should be reported ratably over the period of years
measured by the annuitant's life expectancy and only from that
portion of the annual proceeds which is includible in gross in-
come by virtue of the application of section 72 of the 1954 Code.
This will enable the annuitant to realize his gain on the same
basis that he realizes the return of his capital investment.
This aspect of Revenue Ruling 69-74 was not followed in Estate of Lloyd
G. Bell.122 There, the taxpayers-annuitants transferred stock in a closely
held farming corporation to their children and their spouses in return for
a private annuity. The court found the obligors' promises to be amply
secured and refused to pass on the validity of Revenue Ruling 69-74 since
it involved an unsecured annuity promise. The court also closed the transfer
in the year the exchange was made, distinguishing J. Darsie Lloyd as in-
volving an unsecured promise. The taxpayers were required to include
the entire amount of their realized gain as income in the year the an-
nuity transaction was executed.
Six dissenting judges agreed that the secured promise was a suf-
ficient ground for closing a transaction and would deny the annuitant
the use of the cost recovery method. They disagreed with the majority's
decision that therefore the entire gain realized should be reported in the
year the transfer was made. Instead, they relied on the equivalent of
cash doctrine and a statutory analysis of section 72 to argue that gain
should be deferred. They concluded that because of the "peculiar char-
acteristics" of the private annuity promise, it was not the equivalent of
cash 123 and that gain should be prorated in accordance with section 72.124
The logic of the dissent is faulty and illustrates the uncertainty concern-
ing the proper interrelationship between the equivalent of cash doctrine
and section 1001. The problem with the logic is that if an annuitant does
not include as an amount realized his right to receive future income be-
cause it is not the equivalent of cash, there is no gain realized which need
be reported. For the cash basis annuitant, if only property which is cash
or cash-like constitutes an amount realized under section 1001 (b), then
no gain is realized until he has received payments in excess of his basis in
the property transferred. Thus, the question of how to report the gain
should never arise in the year the promise is received, since there is no
gain realized in that year to report.125
122. 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
123. Id. at 477.
124. Id. at 478.
125. Bell was followed in 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788 (1978).
There, five judges joined in one dissent, id. at 810, and determined that because
of the "peculiar characteristics" of the private annuity, the annuitant should be
able to prorate any gain. Another dissent noted the inconsistency between the
majority decision and the Tax Court's decision in Warren Jones; however, it
recognized that even if the promise had an ascertainable fair market value (for
purposes of the open transaction doctrine), the taxpayer still effectively reports
any gain according to the cost recovery method. This assumes the use of a cash
equivalency test for purposes of § 1001 (b).
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It appears that the reporting of gain realized by an annuitant inder
a section 72 proration approach is unwarranted. The logic behind a
proration approach might be consistent with the goals of section 72126
and the desire to treat the annuitant fairly might be noble; yet, the fact
remains that neither section 72127 nor its predecessor 128 addressed the
recognition of gain realized on the transfer of appreciated property for
an annuity. Both treat only the reporting of gain generated by the annuity
contract itself.1 29 Also, a proration approach forces the annuitant, in ef-
fect, to utilize the installment method provided for in section 453 of the
Code, ostensibly an elective provision. 130
Whatever the ultimate conclusion about whether a section 72 pro-
iation approach should be used,13 1 the decisions and the rulings would
126. Section 72 was designed to alleviate the erratic and harsh treatment of
annuitants who had recovered their basis in the annuity by spreading the tax-
free portion of the annuity income evenly over the annuitant's life. The exclusion
ratio does not change even after the annuitant's life expectancy has been at-
tained. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CoDE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4621, 4640, 4641; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., repiiht'ed
in [1954] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4034.
127. Section 72 addresses the reporting of the income generated by the an-
nuity contract itself. See generally Stewart, Revenue Ruling 69-74 Partially Re-
pudiated, Sub Silentio, by Treasury Regulation § 1.1011-2(c), Example (8)'24
MERcER L. REv. 585, 602-06 (1973).
128. Rev. Act of 1934, § 22 (b) (2), 48 Stat. 687. This became part of the .1939
Internal Revenue Code as ch. 1, § 22 (b) (2), 53 Stat. 10, which provided:
Amounts received as an annuity under an annuity or endowment contract
shall be included in gross income; except that there shall be excluded
from gross income the excess of the amount received in the taxable year
over an amount equal to 3 per centum of the aggregate premiums or con-
sideration paid for such annuity (whether or not paid during such year),
until the aggregate amount excluded from gross income under this chap-
ter or prior income tax laws in respect to such annuity equals the ag-
gregate premiums or consideration paid for such annuity.
129. Stewart, supra note 128, at 605, says that the legislative history of
§ 72 makes it clear that Congress was only trying to make two changes in the law:
(1) [A]bandonment of the arbitrary 3 per cent rate approach of prior,
law, and (2) abandonment of the "heads I win, tails you lose" position
of the government under prior law and to accord the annuitant the
same chance to come out ahead tax-wise by living longer than his life
expectancy, as he had for loss tax-wise under the prior provision if he.
died before recovering his investment in the annuity.
This legislative history of § 72 takes much of the wind out of the assertion of
Rev. Rul. 69-74 that "Revenue Ruling 239, 1953-2 C.B. 53, which was issued
under different provisions of prior law, is not determinative under section 72 (b)
of the Code."
130. For sales of property which meet the requirements of § 453 (and if the
taxpayer so elects), the taxpayer may report as income from the transaction a
proportion of the installment payments actually received in that year. The pro-
portion is determined by the amount of the gross profit realized or to be
realized when the property is paid for, divided by the total contract price. Treas.
Reg. § 1.453-5 (a) (1958).
131. A simple example will illustrate the different reporting approaches
utilized in Rev. Ruls. 69-74 and 239. Assume that A transfers property to B in
return for a private annuity, the periodic payments being $5 yearly. A's basis
in the property transferred is $10, and the property's fair market value is $20 at
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be much clearer if several basic propositions were kept in mind. First,
if the transaction is held open the annuitant should be entitled to use
the cost recovery approach of reporting gain. Second, if the court utilizes
a cash equivalency test for purposes of section 1001 (b) and the transaction
is closed, but the property received by the annuitant is not the equivalent
of cash, then the annuitant should be entitled to use the cost recovery
method. Third, if the transaction is dosed and the property received is
found to be the equivalent of cash (under a cash equivalency approach) or
if the transaction is closed and a fair market value approach is used, the
question then becomes whether section 72 proration applies. Revenue
Ruling 69-74, the dissent in Bell, and one dissent in 212 Corp. say it does;
Revenue Ruling 239, the majority of the Tax Court in Bell, and 212 Corp.
disagree.' 3 2
the time it is transferred. Assume further that A has a life expectancy of 10 years.
Note that in the Rev. Rul. 239 computation, the fair market value of the prop-
erty transferred is used as A's investment in the contract (the numerator) in his
exclusion ratio, while in the Rev. Rul. 69-74 computation, A is only allowed to
use his adjusted basis in the property transferred as the numerator in his § 72
exclusion ratio. This issue is discussed in more detail in text accompanying notes
133-145 infra.
Under the approach of Rev. Rul. 239, A's § 72(b) exclusion ratio is 20/50,
or 2/5. Thus, A treats each annual payment of $5 in the following manner: (a)
2/5 of $5 ($2) is excluded until A has recovered his cost; 3/5 of $5 ($3) is ordinary
income; then (b) 2/5 of $5 ($2). is capital gain until an amount equal to the fair
market value of the property transferred has been received, anid 3/5 of $5 ($3) is
ordinary income; finally (c) 2/5 of $5 ($2) is excluded and 3/5 of $5 ($3) is or-
dinary income. Several cases are in accord with the approach of Rev. Rul. 239.
See Commissioner v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1949); Evans v. Roth-
ensies, 114 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1940); J. Darsie Lloyd v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A.
903 (1936). Note, however, that in each of these cases the transaction was held
open.
Under the approach of Rev. Rul. 69-74, A's § 72 (b) exclusion ratio is 10/50
or 1/5. Thus, A treats-each annual payment of $5 in the following manner: (a)
total gain
1/5 of $5 ($1) is excluded, and $1 (10/10 = life expectancy ) is capital gain,
and 3/5 of $5 ($3) is ordinary income until A reaches life expectancy; then (b)
1/5 of $5 ($1) is excluded and 4/5 of S5 ($4) is ordinary income.
The dissent in Estate of Lloyd G. Bell v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 469, 476(1973), and one dissent in 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788, 810 (1978),
would adopt the proration approach of Rev. Rul. 69-74, except thaf they would
use the fair market valve of the property transferred as the annuitant's invest-
ment in the contract and would allow the annuitant who exceeds his life ex-
pectancy to exclude the capital gain portion. Note that Bell and 212 Corp. held
that the entire amount of the gain was realized and recognized in the year the
property transfer was made.
132. In connection with the deferred recognition of gain realized, the cash
basis annuitant could argue that even though he must include as an amount
realized the fair market value of the annuity promise (irrespective of whether
it is the equivalent of cash), under § 1001 (c) he does not recognize that gain un-
less it is reportable under §§ 446 and- 451. Presumably, under this approach the
annuitant who transferred lroperty with a fair market value of $50 and in
which he had an adjusted basis of $25 for an annuity with a present value of$50 would immediately realize a gain of $25. However, none of this gain would
be recognized until he began to receive payments which exceeded his basis of $25.
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D. Section 72 Exclusion Ratio-"Investment in the Contract"
The numerator in the section 72 exclusion ratio is the annuitant's
investment in the contract.'3 3 The greater its value in relation to the
denominator, the expected return, the higher the ratio and accordingly
the greater the amount of the annuity excluded. Most annuitants thus
would find it to their advantage to have a high "investment in the con-
tract."
Prior to 1969 it was generally recognized that an annuitant's "invest-
ment in the contract" for private annuity transactions was equal to the
fair market value of the property transferred at the date of the transfer,
despite the fact that he reported no gain until he had received payment
which exceeded his basis in the property transferred.134 This approach
was consistent with the view of the private annuity as composed of two
separate transactions: the sale of property and the subsequent purchase
of an annuity with the proceeds from the sale. Thus, "the aggregate
amount of ... consideration paid for the contract"' 35-the investment in
the contract-was presumed to be equal to the fair market value of the
property transferred.
In 1969, however, the Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue Rul-
ing 69-74.138 It limits the annuitant's "investment in the contract" to his
adjusted basis in the property transferred. Since the typical private an-
nuity involves the transfer of appreciated property, the adjusted basis
One problem with this approach is that the annuitant still faces the problem that
since the transaction is immediately dosed, a court is likely to require him to re-
p ort as ordinary income subsequent amounts received by him which exceed the
fair market value of the annuity promise. See text accompanying notes 146-151 infra.
More importantly, the argument does not appear valid. Section 1002 was in-
corporated into § 1001 (c) in 1976. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1 (c) (1957) provides:
Exceptions to the general rule [of recognition] are made, for example,
by sections 351 (a), 354, 361 (a), 371 (a) (1), 371 (b) (1), 721, 1051, 1035,
and 1036. These sections describe certain specific exchanges of prop-
erty in which at the time of the exchange particular differences exist
between the property parted with and the property acquired, but such
differences are more formal than substantial. As to these, the Code pro-
vides that such differences shall not be deemed controlling, and that
gain or loss shall not be recognized at the time of the exchange. The un-
derlying assumption of these exceptions is that the new property is sub-
stantially a continuation of the old investment still unliquidated....
Sections 446 and 451 dearly would not fall within the sweep of the "underlying
assumption" of § 1001 (c).
133. I.R.C. § 72 (c) (1) (2) defines "investment in the contract." See also Treas.
Reg. § 1.72-6 (1956).
134. Hill's Estate v. Maloney, 58 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1944); de Canizares v.
Commissioner, 32 T.C. 345 (1959), acq. 1959-2 C.B. 4; John C. Moore Corp. v.
Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 1140 (1929), affd, 42 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1930); Rev. Rul.
239, 1953-2 C.B. 53. Cf. Ware v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1947)(suggesting that annuitant's basis in the contract is the adjusted basis of the
property transferred). See also Middleditch, supra note 6, at 161; Sams, supra
note 16, at 684.
135. I.R.C. § 72 (c) (1) (A).
136. 1969-1 C.B. 43.
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of the property is usually less than its fair market value. The lesser value,
in turn, renders a less favorable exclusion ratio for the annuitant. The
Service's position in Revenue Ruling 69-74 rests, presumably, upon a treat-
ment of the private annuity analogous to that of a tax-free exchange of
property for an annuity. There is no basis in the Code for treating the
exchange as tax-free. Indeed, Revenue Ruling 69-74 itself recognizes
that it is not tax-free because it requires a proration of gain over the
annuitant's life expectancy.137 The ruling, however, fails to explain its
departure from prior law other than to state: "Since the amount of the
gain is not taxed in full at the time of the transaction, such amount does
not represent a part of the 'premiums or other consideration paid' for
the annuity contract."
It is not difficult to understand the Commissioner's distaste for a
sale-purchase approach. Under traditional private annuity treatment an
annuitant does not realize any gain on the transfer of appreciated prop-
erty until he has recovered his basis in the property.3s If the annuitant
is allowed to include the full fair market value of the property transferred
as his investment in the contract, he is able to exclude a portion of each
annuity payment which does not represent a return of basis nor an
amount of appreciation in value of the property on which the annuitant
has been taxed. However, the Commissioner's alternative, to include only
the annuitant's adjusted basis, appears to be an overkill since Revenue
Ruling 69-74 also ruled that the transaction was dosed and that the gain
thus realized should be reported ratably over the annuitant's remaining
expected life span. As noted by several commentators, theoretical consis-
tency would allow the annuitant to add to his investment in the contract
each year the amount of gain recognized in the prior year.139 While this
"series of transactions" approach may have theoretical appeal, it is not
very practical.
It is unlikely that courts will accept either the Revenue Ruling 69-74
"exchange" or the "series of transaction" approach. Two decisions of the
Tax Court subsequent to Revenue Ruling 69-74 support this proposition.
The Tax Court in Estate of Lloyd G. Bell' 40 found that the private an-
nuity at issue was closed for tax purposes in the year the exchange was
made and distinguished Revenue Rulings 239 and 69-74 as involving
"unsecured" private annuities. This distinction is largely illusory; the
important fact is that in both Revenue Ruling 69-74 and Bell the transfer
was dosed, and the cost recovery approach was denied the taxpayer. In
Bell,'4 ' both the majority, which held the entire gain taxable in the year
137. See generally Stewart, supra note 127, at 611-17.
188. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
139. Raiborn & Watkins, Critical Analysis of Private Annuity Taxation, 50
TAXEs 11, 19-21 (1972); Sams, supra note 16, at 685, 686; Sullivan, supra note 6,
at 475, 476.
140. 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
141. Id. at 472, 473.
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of transfer, and the dissent,142 which adopted a proration approach simi-
lar to that in Revenue Ruling 69-74, found the investment in the contract
to be equal to the amount required to purchase the annuity. In an arm's
length transfer that amount is equal to the fair market value of the prop-
erty transferred. However, if the transaction constitutes in part a gift, the
investment in the contract is limited to the present value of the annuity
received, irrespective of the fair market value of the property transferred.
143
Use of the annuitant's adjusted basis as his investment in the contract
may have a greater justification if the private annuity is deemed open and
gain recognition is deferred until the annuitant's basis is recovered. How-
ever, use of fair market value is more consistent with the general intent of
section 72. It seems that the latter approach, consistent with section 72,
should be used for purposes of its provisions, rather than an approach
which, though more consistent with section 1001, is contrary to the in-
tent of section 72.144 The decisions are unanimous in following thd sale--
purchase approach and allowing the annuitant to include the fair market
value as his investment in the contract, at least if no element of gift-is
142. Id. at 478, 479 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
143. The court noted that while the taxpayers claimed the fair market value
of the property transferred was $207,600, they also conceded that the acttiarial
value of the annuity received was only $142,573. It concluded that this difference
could only be attributable to the family relationship, deemed this difference to be
a gift, and thus limited the taxpayer's "investment in the contract" to the actu-
arial value of the annuity contract of $142,573. Id. at 473. Since most private
annuities involve intra-family exchanges, the "investment in the contract" will
usually be limited to the actuarial value of the annuity received, irrespective -of
the fair market value of the property transferred.
Bell was followed in 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788, 798 (1978).
There, the court said:
It is now well settled that in cases in which appreciated property is
transferred in consideration for an annuity, the annuitant's investment
in the contract is the fair market value of the property transferred....
However, such rule is applicable only when the parties are dealing at
arm's length. When the fair market value of the property transferred- sub-
stantially exceeds the value of the annuity received, such excess is deemed
to be a gift in the absence of proof to the contrary, and the taxpayer's
investment in the contract is limited to the value of the annuity ...
Thus, we must find both the value of the annuity and the value of the
properties transferred in exchange for it.
This approach assumes that the value of the annuity received can be fairly
determined, an assumption that is suspect, especially if the annuity promise is
unsecured. See text accompanying notes 35-73 supra.
144. See note 72 supra. It may appear unjust to allow the annuitant to use
a fair market value of the property transferred for purposes of the § 72 exclusion
ratio, while not for determining a fair market value for the annuity promise re-
ceived. But the same result could obtain if a cash equivalency test is applied to
§ 1001 (b). The promise may have a fair market value, but may not be the
equivalent of cash. In that case, the annuitant could obtain the benefit of the
fair market value of the property transferred (assuming no gift element is
present) for purposes of § 72, but would not report any gain until he had received
cash or its equivalent greater than his basis in the property transferred.
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present. 14 Thus, despite Revenue Ruling 69-74, the annuitant should in-
clude the fair market value of the property as his investment in the con-
tract. He has reasonable grounds for doing so whether the transfer is
deemed closed and gain is immediately recognized or prorated, or the
transfer is held open and gain is deferred until the annuitant has re-
couped his basis.
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Nature of the Gain
Another good reason for structuring the private annuity in a way
that minimizes chances that it will be closed for tax purposes in the year
of the transfer is to insure to the annuitant capital gain -treatment of his
entire gain potential. It is clear that if the transaction is held open all
payments received by the annuitant will be treated as giving rise to
capital gain, just as if they had been received at the time of the- transfer.14 6
If.the transaction is closed, however, it is likely that a court would re-
quire an annuitant to report as ordinary income subsequent amounts
received which exceed the amount included as the fair market value of
the. annuity promise.' 47 The basis for this treatment is that the subsequent
amouits are not received in connection with the sale or exchange: of -a
capital asset.' 48
An annuitant confronted with this dilemma might :be: able to con-
.vince the court that the doctrine of Arrowsnith v. Commissioner149
should apply to him; requiring that if the gain he originally reported
when the transaction was closed was capital gain, any gain subsequently
repQrted by him which arose out of the same transfer of property should
also .be capital. In Arrowsmith, two taxpayers liquidated, a corporation
and .divided the proceeds. Partial distributions of the proceeds were made
during the years 1937 to 1940, and the profits therefrom were reported as
capital gains. In. 1944 a judgment was rendered against the -liquidated
corporation which the two taxpayers were required to pay. They reported
the payment as an ordinary loss. The Supreme Court denied the taxpay-
ers ordinary loss treatment, holding that despite the principle that each
taxable year is a separate unit for tax accounting purposes, the 1937 to
145. Hill's Estate v. Maloney, 58 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1944); 212 Corp. v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788 (1978); Estate of Lloyd G. Bell v. Commissioner, 60
T.C. 469 (1973); de Canizares v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 345 (1959), acq. 1959-2
C.B. 4. See also Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 C.B. 53. But see Ware v. Commissioner,
159.F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1947).
'146. Waring v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 800, 801 (3d Cir. 1969); Estate of
Meade v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1974); Dennis v. Commis-
sioner,,473 F.2d 274, 285 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398, 1403, 1404
(9th Cir. 1975); Westover v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949).
147. Tombari v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 1962). See also War-
ren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788, 791, 792- (9th Cir. 1975).
148. I.R.C. § 1222.
149.'344 U.S. 6 (1952).
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1944 liquidation transaction events should be considered together in
order to classify the nature of the 1944 loss. Thus, the Court found that
the loss was capital since the original transaction out of which it arose
and of which it was a part was a transaction entitled to capital gain and
loss treatment.
The annuitant should also consider Lowe v. Commissioner,'5" which
concerned a gain recognized after the transaction had been closed. There
the taxpayer sold all of the stock of a corporation in 1955, receiving in
return a down payment and a promissory note for the balance of the
purchase price. The stock was retained by the taxpayer as security. Three
years later the purchaser defaulted on the remaining payments. He re-
conveyed the stock to the taxpayer, and the taxpayer retained $22,500 of
the amount paid by the purchaser toward the purchase price as considera-
tion for the release of the purchaser from further liability. Finding that
the transaction was closed in 1955, the court dealt with the proper char-
acterization of the $22,500 received by the taxpayer in 1958. It concluded
that the subsequent "adjustment" or "revision" of the sale was not a
transaction separate from the original transaction. The later transaction
was "part and parcel" of the original sale.151 Thus, the original transaction
being capital in nature, the gains later received were also capital even
though the gains were received in years after the transaction was re-
garded as closed.
It seems reasonable that a private annuitant should receive the same
treatment. If he is required to compute, realize, and recognize gain in the
year the exchange is made, it is on the basis of estimates of his life span
that he does so. Typically, the obligor is an individual and the annuitant
receives only his unsecured promise; there is no guarantee of the obligor's
future ability or willingness to pay. Indeed, even if the annuity promise
can be ascribed a fair market value, that value is certain to be discounted
from the actuarial value. Under these circumstances, it seems reasonable to
argue that the fact that the annuitant eventually receives more than that
amount originally deemed to be the fair market value of the contract for
purposes of section 1001 (b) is no more than a subsequent adjustment or
revision of the original exchange. The later gain arose from the same trans-
action wherein the property was transferred; it was "part and parcel" of
that exchange. Therefore, its nature as capital or ordinary gain should be
determined by reference to the original exchange.
B. Loss Deductions
The taxpayer's estate is not entitled to claim a loss for the premature
death of the annuitant. Three reasons have been advanced for this- posi-
tion: (1) the transaction was not entered into for profit;' 52 (2) the tax-
150. 44 T.C. 363 (1965), acq. 1966-1 C.B. 2.
151. Id. at 374.
152. Industrial Trust Co. v. Broderick, 94 F.2d 927, 930 (1st Cir. 1938).
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payer received what he contracted for; 153 and (3) it would be asymmetrical
to permit a deduction for mortality loss while excluding from income any
mortality gain.'6 4 Often applicable will be section 267 of the Code which
disallows deductions for losses from sales or exchanges of property be-
tween "related" taxpayers.
The annuitant may not claim a loss deduction upon the transfer of
depreciated property to the obligor. Evans v. Rothensies,15 5 the leading
case for this proposition, based its conclusion on the open transaction
doctrine. The court felt that no loss was realized since the annuity con-
tract did not have a sufficiently ascertainable fair market value for pur-
poses of section 1001. In this regard, Revenue Ruling 69-74 is in the an-
nuitant's favor. If the open transaction doctrine is not applied to the
private annuity, the annuitant should be able to immediately recognize a
loss on the transfer of depreciated property. Here again, however, section
267 is likely to have an unfavorable impact.
C. Attribution of Income to the Annuitant
Rather than make an outright transfer, the annuitant frequently will
prefer to transfer property to a trust for the benefit of his children. He
may prefer a trust arrangement because of instability in the family, the
youth of the children, or some other reason that leads him to question
their ability to manage the property in a proper manner. If the annuitant
chooses to structure the private annuity in this fashion he must be care-
ful to avoid the application of the grantor trust rules.16 This series of
rules provides that when the grantor of a trust has retained substantial
dominion or control over the income of a trust, that income should be
taxed to the grantor and not to the trust.
Lazarus v. Commissioner'57 offers an example of these adverse tax
consequences to the annuitant. In Lazarus, the taxpayers transferred a
shopping center to the recently formed N & V Realty Corporation
(N & V) in return for its stock. They next established a trust with
Arawak Trust Co. Ltd., a Bahamian corporation, as trustee. After an
initial funding of $1,000, the stock of N & V was transferred to the trust
in exchange for its unsecured promise to pay the taxpayers a joint and
survivor annuity of $75,000 per year. The trustee then sold the N & V
stock to another Bahamian corporation, Aruba Bonaire Curacao Trust
Co. Ltd. (ABC), which it represented and managed, in exchange for a
nonassignable promissory note to pay $1,000,000 in twenty years plus
annual interest of $75,000 per year. The Tax Court found and the Ninth
Circuit agreed that the transaction was not in substance a sale in
153. Helvering v. Louis, 77 F.2d 386, 387, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
154. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1220, 1221.
155. 114 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1940).
156. I.R.C. §§ 671-678.
157. -513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'g 58 T.C. 854 (1972).
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consideration for an annuity, but rather was a transfer in trust subject to
a reservation of income. Therefore, under section 677 (a), the taxpayers
were deemed owners of the trust and were taxed on the income therefrom
under section 671.
Essential to the courts' conclusions were findings that all of the docu-
ments executed were part of a prearranged plan; the courts therefore con-
strued these documents together. In holding that the transaction was, in
substance, a transfer in trust with a retained life estate, the courts said
that no private annuity was ever created. The trust merely served as a
conduit for the proceeds of the sale of N & V stock from ABC to the tax-
payers in a manner calculated to defer capital gain recognition and ob-
tain gift and estate tax savings.
Another illustration of the application of the grantor trust rules is
Bixby v. Commissioner.158 In Bixby seven trusts were established, each
bearing the name of a taxpayer-family member whose descendants were
to be benefited by that trust. On the same day that the trusts were
created, each family rhember for whom a trust was named purchased from
his "namesake" trust a private annuity. Each in turn transferred to "his"
trust stock in a closely held family corporation. Each trust was to accumu-
late and reinvest trust income until the death of the person for whom.tbe
trust was named. Substantial powers over the income, corpus, and trustees
of the trust were retained by each taxpayer-family member. Under these
circumstances, the Tax Court found that the annual payments were not
annuity payments. Instead, the court said that because of the degree of
control maintained by each taxpayer-family member over his "namesake"
trust, the payments were actually distributions falling within section
677 (a) (1). Thus, the income of the trusts was taxable to the .taxpayer-
family members under section 671. The court felt that the test.of control
should be applied strictly in the area of private annuities "in order to
curb abuses."
Revenue Ruling 68-183159 sheds some light on this problem. -It gives
the example of a grantor of a trust who transferred to the trustee cor-
porate stock for the benefit of his grandchildren. The trustee was given dis-
cretion to determine the needs of the beneficiaries and to pay out as 'much as
those needs required. The grantor subsequently transferred more corporate
stock to the trust, receiving in return an annuity, the yearly amount of
which depended upon the current 'income yield of the entire property
held in trust. The only funds available for making the payments were
those received as income of the trust, unless the stock were to be con-
verted to cash. The Commissioner ruled that under these circumstances
the grantor had made a contribution of stock to the trust with a reserva-
tion of the income for life. Thus, the grantor was treated as. the owner
158. 58 T.C. 757 (1972), acq. 1975-1 C.B. 1.
159. 1968-1 C.B. 308.
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of the trust under section 677 and taxed on all the income therefrom
under section 671.
In some cases, income has been held taxable to the transferor when
he -has ,transferred property outright to another and the periodic pay-
ment that he is to receive in return is dependent upon the amount of
incomne produced from the property transferred.10 0 In such circumstances
the transferee-obligor is considered a trustee who is required to account
to. the grantor for the income received from the property. Income is dis-
tinguished from an annuity. The income is considered the grantor's and
is reportable by him; the obligor merely serves as a conduit.
V. CONCLUSION
The private annuity, as an estate planning tool, offers a medium for
ihe--lifetime transfer of property which decreases the transferor's taxable
estate at death, yet assures him a yearly income until his death. If the
transfer is made for adequate and full consideration, the transferor incurs
no gift tax. If structured properly, the transferor-annuitant can defer the
recognition of gain on the transfer of appreciated property. Three grounds
for income tax deferral have been considered in this comment.
The first was the open transaction doctrine. The courts have been
unanimous in holding that if the annuitant does not receive any security
for the obligor's promise and if the obligor is an individual, the annuitant
can defer the realization and recognition of gain until he has recovered his
basis in the property transferred. However, Revenue Ruling 69-74 rejects
this view, and the annuitant should consider carefully some of the language
from Estate of Lloyd G. Bell and 212 Corp. which also seems contrary to
this view.
The second ground considered was the equivalent of cash doctrine.
Traditionally, the courts have applied this test to determine whether a
contract for deferred payments is an amount realized under section
1001 (b) to cash basis taxpayers. In a private annuity context, the obligor's
promise to make further periodic payments, if unsecured, is not the equiva-
lent of cash. It is uncertain whether even the secured promise of the ob-
ligor is the equivalent of cash. Thus, at first blush, the cash basis private
annuitant can defer the realization of gain on the basis of the equivalent
of cash doctrine. However, the courts do not seem willing to apply this
doctrine to the private annuitant, Revenue Ruling 69-74 ignores the tax-
payer's method of reporting income, and at least one court has rejected
application of a cash equivalency test to section 1001 (b), applying instead a
fair market value test.
The third ground considered was whether section 72 allows the
annuitant to report ratably over his remaining life expectancy any gain
160. Bettendorf v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1931); Fay v. Com-
missioner, 34 B.T.A. 662 (1936).
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which he is required to realize. Section 72 does not appear to be authority
for such a proration approach; it treats only the reporting of income
generated by the annuity contract itself. However, Revenue Ruling 69-74,
the dissent in Estate of Lloyd G. Bell, and one dissent in 212 Corp. apply
such an approach. In addition to those mentioned in this comment,
other troubling tax questions exist for the private annuitant. They in-
clude, for example, the estate and gift tax consequences of a private an-
nuity to the annuitant, as well as the obligor's side of the equation. Be-
fore an individual purchases a private annuity, these factors, must be
carefully considered and weighed to determine whether a private annuity
would effect a desired transfer with a minimization of tax liability.
Structured properly and utilized with discretion, the private annuity can
be an effective tool for the estate planner.
JOSEPH C. BENAGE
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